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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CARNICERO DYNASTY 
CORPORATION, a corporation; 
WENDELL L. BUTCHER; IRENE 
B. BUTCHER; CHRIST L. 
STANFIELD; JANIS B. 
STANFIELD; BEN D. ISSAC; 
and LILA O. ISSAC, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' RELIEF BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Suite by bonding company against alleged indem-
nitors who signed indemnity agreement after bond had 
been issued. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court refused to dismiss for failure to prove 
enforceable agreement or to permit amendment to con-
form to evidence re absence of consideration and awarded 
judgment against alleged indemnitors for $44,600.00. 
Case No. 
13836 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Order reversing judgment and dismissing case as 
to defendants Butcher, or in the alternative, remand-
ing the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Butchers incorporate herein by reference the state-
ment of facts found on pages 2 thru 5 of their original 
brief. 
This reply brief is filed to correct grossly misleading 
statements of alleged facts contained in plaintiff's brief. 
Among other things, plaintiff would mislead the 
Court into believing: 
1. That plaintiff requested an indemnity agreement 
from Butchers before it issued the bond to Carnicero. 
(Plaintiffs brief pages 3-6, 9, 11, 17-21). 
In fact Mills was not requested to obtain an indem-
nity agreement from Butcher until four months after 
the bond had been issued to Carnicero. (Bond issued 
Jan 6, 1969 — exhibit 3-P and he did not ask Butchers 
to sign the indemnity agreement until May 7, 1969 — 
exhibit 1-P). (R. 302-303; 375-380; 385-387) 
2. That the bond was issued to Carnicero in con-
sideration of an alleged agreement by Butchers to sign 
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3 
an indemnity agreement. (Plaintiff's brief pages 3-6, 
10-13, 17-21) 
The indemnity agreement required by plaintiff (Ex-
hibit 2-P) was typed in plaintiff's Denver office, and in-
cluded the typed names of the persons who were to sign 
that indemnity agreement. (R. 375-380; 382; 384-387). 
The Court summarized the testimony of plaintiff's 
agent Mills (R. 375-376) as follows: 
"THE COURT: Why did you wait until May to ask 
Mr. Butcher to sign the Indemnity Agreement. 
THE WITNESS (Mills): You will have to ask the 
company that because I do what the company 
ask me in regard to those items. 
THE COURT: So from that, I take it, you went 
out and got his signature (Butcher's) on that 
Indemnity agreement in May of 1969 because 
you were instructed to do so by your company? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Yes, sir." 
At the conclusion of the trial the Court in sum-
marizing the evidence concerning the Butchers' indem-
nity agreement stated as follows (R. 417): 
". . . More than four months after the bond is 
issued, . . . the insurance company as an obvious 
afterthought, goes out through their agent Mills, and 
he gets the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Butcher on 
. . . an Indemnity Agreement. . . ." 
It is clear from the foregoing that the bond was not 
in fact issued in consideration of an agreement by But-
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chers to sign an indemnity agreement as claimed by 
plaintiff. 
3. That the tardiness of plaintiffs agent Mills in 
obtaining the signatures of Butchers was the reason that 
the Butcher indemnity agreement was signed after plain-
tiff issued it's bond to Carnicero. (Plaintiff's brief page 
18). 
In fact Mills testified (as indicated in par #2 above) 
that plaintiff's Denver office determined who was to 
sign the indemnity agreements and that he simply did 
what he was told and obtained signatures of the persons 
named by the Denver office. (R. 377-380; 382, 385-387). 
He also testified that he was not requested to obtain the 
signatures of Butchers on an indemnity agreement until 
about four months after the bonds had been issued; that 
he promptly obtained those signatures and returned the 
Butcher indemnity agreements to the Denver office of 
plaintiff. (R. 375-377, 417) There is absolutely no evi-
dence in the record which even suggests that Mills was 
tardy in obtaining signatures, or that the signatures of 
Butchers were requested on a date earlier than the date 
upon which they were obtained. 
4. That the Court allegedly weighed conflicting 
testimony and allegedly chose to believe the alleged testi-
mony of Mills that the indemnification agreement from 
Butchers was requested and promised prior to the issu-
ance of the bonds. (Plaintiffs brief pages 13 and 19). 
As illustrated under paragraphs #2 and #3 above, the 
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court did not weigh conflicting testimony as to the time 
when the Butcher indemnity agreement was first re-
quested, but concluded in it's summarization of evidence 
at the conclusion of the trial (quoted in paragraph #2 
above) (R. 417) that there was no promise by Butchers 
to sign an indemnity agreement prior to the issuance of 
the bonds. Also in its memorandum decision (denying 
Butchers' motions to dismiss or to amend to conform to 
the evidence) the Court (R. 147-149) did not find that 
Butchers had promised to sign the indemnity agreement 
prior to issuance of the bonds (as claimed by plaintiff 
in it's brief). The Court's decision is based entirely upon 
the failure of Butchers to plead lack of consideration in 
their answer, and upon Butchers failure to amend their 
answer to assert that defense during the four months 
between the time when plaintiff furnished information 
in answer to interrogatories (from which the availabil-
ity of that defense could have been determined had 
counsel for Butchers been more astute), and the trial 
(R. 148-149). See Butchers original brief for discussion 
of error in that court decision. 
5. That the testimony quoted on pages 3-5 of plain-
tiffs brief supports plaintiffs unfounded claim that 
Butchers personally agreed to sign an indemnity agree-
ment prior to issuance of the bonds. 
Mills testimony, quoted in plaintiff's brief, relates to 
Mills obtaining indemnity agreements before the bonds 
were issued. Mills there testified that he requested the 
indemnity agreement (from Stanfields and Isaacs) thru 
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Butcher prior to issuing the bonds. It is not disputed 
that the request for indemnity agreements were made 
through Butcher since he was the only person from Car-
nicero with whom Mills dealt (R. 370), however, the 
request was for an indemnity agreement from the Stan-
fields (Butchers daughter and son-in-law) and Isaacs 
(who were wholly unrelated to Butcher, contrary to 
the claims of plaintiff on page 3 of brief), but no request 
for an indemnity agreement was made of Butchers be-
fore the bonds were issued. It is interesting to note that 
immediately following the language quoted by plaintiff 
on page 4 of it's brief and relied upon by plaintiff to 
support its claims, that the Court asked the questions 
and received the answers quoted in paragraph #2 above 
(Page 3) to the effect that the sole reason Mills ob-
tained the signatures of Butchers in May, 1969, was 
because it was requested at that time by plaintiff, which 
wholly refutes plaintiff's claim that the language quoted 
on page 4 of plaintiff's brief tends to prove an earlier 
agreement by Butchers to sign an indemnity agreement. 
The Butcher testimony, quoted on page 5 of plain 
tiff's brief, apparently relies upon the use of the word 
"we" by Butcher when discussing plaintiff's require-
ment that indemnity agreements be obtained. The quoted 
testimony does not state that Butchers agreed to sign 
an indemnity or explain who is meant by the word "we." 
Butcher expressly stated in his testimony that when he 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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said "we" he was referring to Carnicero. (R. 299). Since 
plaintiff has obviously selected the testimony most favor-
able to it's claim that Butchers agreed to sign an indem-
nity agreement to induce plaintiff to furnish a bond to 
Carnicero, and since the testimony selected by plaintiff 
does not establish such an agreement, it is clear that 
Butchers did not make such agreement. 
6. That about four months after the bonds had been 
delivered, plaintiff ". . . insisted that Mr. and Mrs. 
Butcher complete their agreement by signing the indem-
nification and returning it to the company." (Plaintiff's 
brief page 12). 
The above-quoted gratuitous statement is not re-
ferenced to any testimony or evidence in the record 
and in fact is not supported by the record. As demon-
strated above (see paragraphs #2 and 3 above and the 
testimony of Mills there quoted) no such agreement 
was ever made by Butchers and no claim was ever made 
at the trial that Butchers were completing a prior agree-
ment when they signed the indemnity agreement. 
As indicated above, the undisputed testimony is that 
some four months after the bonds were delivered, as an 
obvious afterthought, plaintiff requested and received 
an indemnity agreement from Butchers (without giving 
consideration therefore). (R.302-303; 376-379; 386-387; 
417). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BUTCHERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO IN-
DEMNIFY PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff apparently agrees with the legal arguments 
presented in Butchers' original brief since they have 
not responded thereto, except to claim that those legal 
principles are inapplicable because of plaintiff's unfound-
ded claim that the bond was issued in consideration of 
an earlier promise by Butchers to sign an indemnity 
agreement, (Point I of plaintiff's brief), and to claim 
prejudice in responding to Butchers' defense of lack of 
consideration (Point II of plaintiff's brief). 
Plaintiff's brief acknowledges, in effect, that the 
Butcher indemnity agreement is unenforceable unless 
the bond was issued for Carnicero by plaintiff in re-
liance upon an agreement by Butchers to later sign such 
an indemnity agreement, and is directed primarily at 
establishing that the indemnity agreement need not be 
signed before the bond is issued if the signer signs in 
pursuance of his own previous promise to do so. (Plain-
tiff brief P. 15). We agree with that legal proposition, 
however it has no application to the facts in this case 
since (contrary to plaintiff's assertions in it's brief) 
Butchers were not requested to sign an indemnity agree-
ment and did not promise to do so prior to issuance 
of the bond by plaintiff. See discussion under "State-
ment of Facts on pages 2 thru 7 of this brief. 
Very simply stated then, the sole issue to be deter-
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mined by the Court under plaintiff's point I is whether 
or not the evidence, when construed in the light most 
favorable to the judgment, would justify a finding that 
plaintiff issued it's bond in reliance upon a promise by 
Butchers to execute an indemnity agreement. The Court 
found that the evidence did not support such a finding 
(R. 375-376; 417; 147-149). Also see discussion under 
"Statement of Facts." 
Further, it is nowhere asserted in plaintiff's brief 
(or in the court record) that Mrs. Butcher promised 
to execute an indemnity agreement to induce the 
issuance of a bond. On the contrary, Mills testified 
that Wendell Butcher was the only person with 
whom he dealt concerning the indemnity agreements. 
(R. 370). In it's brief plaintiff very cavalierly treats 
both Mr. and Mrs. Butcher as if they were a single 
person. Even if Wendell Butcher were liable under the 
indemnity agreement (which we deny), no facts have 
been alleged or proven which would impose liability 
upon Mrs. Butcher. 
POINT II 
BUTCHERS FAILURE TO RAISE DEFENSE OF 
LACK OF CONSIDERATION IN THEIR ANSWER 
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THEM FROM ASSERTING 
THAT DEFENSE AT THE TRIAL AFTER PLAIN-
TIFF ITSELF INTRODUCED EVIDENCE WHICH 
MADE BUCHERS' COUNSEL AWARE OF THAT 
DEFENSE 
Much of the argument under point II of plaintiff's 
brief is a rehash of plaintiff's unfounded assertion that 
the bond was issued in reliance upon an alleged agree-
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ment by Butchers to sign an indemnity agreement. See 
discussion under statement of facts and point I above. 
In summary, plaintiff's second point asserts: 
1. That lack of consideration is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded, citing rule 8 (c), URCP, 
Plaintiff has confused failure of consideration (which 
is defense to previously enforceable contract, and must 
be pleaded under rule 8 (c) URCP), with lack of con-
sideration (where no valid contract ever existed and 
which can be raised for the first time at the trial as 
provided by Rule 41 (b), URCP). See discussion on 
pages 8-16 of Butchers original brief herein. 
2. That plaintiff was prejudiced in meeting that 
defense at the trial by Butchers not amending their 
answer to assert that defense, when plaintiffs answers 
to interrogatories supplied facts from which availability 
of that defense could have been learned. Plaintiff has 
failed to point to any witness or evidence which it might 
have presented at the trial had Butchers asserted the 
defense four months earlier when plaintiff finally an-
swered Butchers' interrogatories (over a year late). 
At the most plaintiff has speculated that since a person 
who formerly worked at plaintiff's bonding department 
was not available for the trial because he no longer 
worked for plaintiff, his testimony might have been 
favorable to plaintiff. No proffer of proof was made as 
to what evidence that person might have presented had 
he been called, or as to how it might have affected the 
trial of the past consideration issue. (Plaintiff's brief 
P. 21). Mills testified that several different people 
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worked on this bond, and that since plaintiff's Denver 
office retained copies of everything he did not keep his 
files even though he knew that a dispute had arisen 
concerning the bond. (R. 382, 384). There is no claim 
by plaintiff that the destroyed files of Mills would have 
oeen available for the trial had Butchers asserted the 
past consideration defense four months earlier (Mills 
only retained his files for three years — R. 383), or 
that the former employee of plaintiff would have been 
available for trial or would have been able to give help-
ful testimony on the vital question of past consideration 
had that defense been raised four months earlier. Under 
Rule 15(b), URCP, the burden was upon plaintiff to 
satisfy the court that the admission of evidence concern-
ing past consideration would prejudice plaintiff in main-
taining his action on the merits. Plaintiff not only failed 
to object to the admission of that evidence, but plain-
tiff itself introduced that evidence. Rule 15(b), URCP, 
further provides that the Court shall grant a continu-
ance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. Plaintiff did not move for a continuance 
to permit it to locate additional files or witnesses, but 
chose to stand on the record before the Court. A de-
termination of the case on its merits within the meaning 
of Rule 15(b), URCP, requires a determination that 
Butchers were never legally bound to indemnify plain-
tiff because the Butcher indemnity agreement was not 
supported by any consideration. 
Plaintiff claim that the 5% year delay in bringing 
this matter to trial created prejudice which precludes 
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Butchers from then asserting the absence of consider-
ation defense. As indicated on page 18 of Butchers' 
original brief, that delay resulted from plaintiff's failure 
to answer Butchers' interrogatories, which resulted in 
cancellation of four separate trial dates. (P. 19 of But-
chers' brief). Plaintiff argues that the last cancellation 
was at the request of Butchers' counsel. (Plaintiff's 
brief P. 9-10). It is true that Butchers' counsel moved 
for a continuance of the trial scheduled Jan. 23, 1974, 
because plaintiff had finally filed it's answers to But-
chers' interrogatories (after a delay of over a year in 
answering) on January 17, 1974, only five days before 
the scheduled trial date, leaving insufficient time to 
review the 28 page answer and to prepare for trial. 
Plaintiff cannot now blame Butchers for it's delay in 
bringing this matter to trial and then take advantage 
of it's own delay, so as to prejudice Butchers in as-
serting an absolute defense to plaintiff's claim, since 
Butchers first became aware of that defense when 
plaintiff introduced the bond and the indemnity 
agreement into evidence at the trial. 
Plaintiff has simply not shown facts which would 
justify the court's refusal to permit Butchers to assert 
the defense of lack of consideration at the trial. See also 
discussion on pages 16-20 of Butchers original brief 
herein. The decision of the Court refusing to permit 
Butchers to assert the defense of past consideration is 
in error and should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Butchers' indemnity agreement is unenforceable for 
lack of consideration, having been executed for months 
after the bonds were issued by plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
unfounded claim that the bonds were issued by plain-
tiff in reliance upon an alleged oral agreement by But-
chers to later sign an indemnity agreement is contrary 
to the undisputed evidence, including the testimony of 
plaintiff's agent Mills, who negotiated for the bonds. 
Plaintiff's claim that Butchers should be precluded 
from asserting that they never were liable to plaintiff 
under the indemnity agreements, due to lack of consid-
eration, because Butchers didn't plead that defense in 
their answer. Butchers did not discover the availibility 
of that defense until plaintiff introduced the bond and 
indemnity agreement at the trial. Plaintiff claims that 
it was prejudiced in responding to that defense by the 
delay in asserting the defense, but failed to request a 
continuance in order to meet that defense as contem-
plated by Rule 15(b), URCP, and failed to point to or 
to make a proffer of evidence which it could have pro-
duced had Butchers discovered that defense and moved 
to amend their answer some four months earlier when 
plaintiffs answers to interrogatories disclosed dates from 
which the availability of that defense might have been 
learned. At most plaintiff has only speculated that evi-
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dence favorable to plaintiff might have been available 
had it learned of the absence of consideration defense 
four months earlier. As an expert in the bonding busi-
ness surely plaintiff was always aware that the Butchers 
indemnity agreement was not enforceable. 
The evidence before the court establishes conclu-
sively that Butchers (and particularly Mrs. Butcher) 
were never asked to sign an indemnity agreement until 
some four months after plaintiff delivered it's bonds 
without requesting or requiring an agreement to give 
an indemnity agreement from Butchers. Acordingly, 
the judgment should be vacated and the case dismissed 
as to Butchers, or should be remanded for a new trial 
on the issue of whether or not Butchers made an oral 
promise to sign an indemnity agreement to induce plain-
tiff to execute it's bond for the defendant Carnicero. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone 486-9636 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Appellants 
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